The simmering tensions between India and Pakistan have become a daily affair since the Pahalgam attacks last week. But so far, India has refrained from launching a full-scale military attack. This state of affairs prompts us to ask, what exactly are the two countries’ end goals? For Pakistan, beyond its longstanding objective of reclaiming all of Kashmir, there appears to be none. By contrast, India’s strategic calculus is centred on continued economic growth, and avoiding the costs of a full-blown war. In the context of the worldwide economic chaos unleashed by Trump and the war in Ukraine, it remains to be seen if other countries can afford to remain on the sidelines. That said, America has already expressed support for India, notwithstanding Trump’s laughable comment about this dispute spanning a thousand years (it began only in 1947-48).
For Pakistan, the path to the goal is complex: covert military support, funding and overt statements of “diplomatic and moral support”. However, these have already played a role in sustaining the conflict, without any results to show. Indo-Pak conflict
For India, the path is more measured. Retaining its portion of Kashmir and keeping the peace is only one aspect: its strategic goals are explicitly tied to its economic ambitions, and could set the country back by years. Beyond that, two reasons underpin India’s cautious posture: for one, losing pilots in combat (as it did in 2019) would be a national embarrassment, and secondly, its aircraft and defence infrastructure are not yet at full potential. Pakistan’s US-made F-16s fare better than India’s MiG “flying coffins”. This disparity in the air can lead to initial reverses, even as India is otherwise far, far stronger.
These considerations are further complicated by recent domestic events. India’s demolition of five homes of suspected terrorists, raises questions about operational transparency. Critics argue that if the homes were in India, how could they all be suspected Pakistani militants? Also, with the act of demolition, was there no benefit in gathering evidence? Or was the demolition a retaliatory gesture executed without concrete proof of wrongdoing, essentially tipping the balance from military action to an act of revenge? To be clear, however, while home demolitions are deplorable, they do not compare to the brutality of seeking out victims by religion and gunning down the non-Muslims.
An easier option for India has been to mirror Pakistan’s use of “diplomatic and moral” support, by backing insurgent groups in regions like Balochistan, the North-west Frontier Province (NWFP), Sindh, and building closer connections to Afghanistan. The Taliban might seem like strange bedfellows, but India could leverage them to undermine Pakistan. Given the history with Bangladesh, however, there is no guarantee that a friend today will remain one tomorrow. Even so, India may decide (or have decided) that supporting a future constellation of semi-friendly, semi-hostile states along its northwestern border is preferable to the status quo of a monolithic and intransigent Pakistan, which is hard to negotiate with and impossible to defeat. Major Gaurav Arya and others have stated that a resolution to Kashmir goes through Balochistan but the risk is that an attack in Balochistan ascribed to India could lead to more blood shed in Pahalgam, serving to worsen the conflagration. Pakistan may be destroyed eventually, but can India handle the economic and political price?
The strategic dynamics are further muddied by the role of water politics and external players. Keeping the Indus Water Treaty in abeyance appears to be largely symbolic for now, given the inadequate infrastructure to control water flows. Moreover, while India’s upstream position relative to Pakistan might give it leverage, it is itself downstream from China. This layered interdependency raises the spectre of Chinese support on behalf of Pakistan. Also, in addition to Pakistan’s limited economic value to China, an independent Balochistan could present an economic partnership more enticing for Beijing – a nuance that could reshape the entire balance of power on the subcontinent.
The China Factor, flipped. Indo-Pak conflict
There remains a possibility, albeit small, that India and China, recognising the mutual benefits of regional stability, could engage in a larger strategic agreement that manages and contains Pakistan while simultaneously promoting economic growth. Yet this option is fraught with its own challenges, particularly in light of recent events at Galwan in 2020, which have cast a long shadow over China’s commitment to honouring its agreements, particularly when India’s back is turned.
Thus, the situation remains fluid, with India having refrained from an all-out attack so far. Things could change in the next day, or the next hour, but for now, India’s aggressive posture, without concomitant action, serves to maintain a precarious status quo. The world watches on. Indo-Pak conflict
